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The Problem with Auditing Is . . . .
(The Stuff Dreams Are Made of)
Marvin L. Stone
Stone, Gray and Company
Most of the other papers delivered at this symposium commence with the
word "toward," e.g., Toward Standards for Statistical Sampling, Toward Standards for Materiality, Toward a Philosophy of Auditing. Apparently our chairman had no wish to go "toward" further problems in auditing when he assigned
my topic. Consequently, my talk may be described as "untoward." I have
thought a great deal about my topic since I received the assignment—so much in
fact, that it has found its way into my dreams. Before addressing myself formally
to the topic, let me describe a few of those dreams. My dreams are seldom, if
ever, in technicolor. Everything is in sharply defined black and white—no gray
areas, as in real life.
Dream No. 1—Independence and Fees
The scene of dream number one is a courtroom in which Ralph Nader is
presiding judge. As my dream commenced, I was on the witness stand and
was being asked to describe the CPA's role. The questioner was a not-toofriendly banker who frequently questions the CPA's independence. In all
candor, his question was a little more pointed—something like, "What the hell
do you auditors do, anyway?"
Casting aside my well-known reticence to speak before an audience, I
delivered the following carefully prepared extemporaneous remarks:
The business community in which all of us live and work is very much
like a giant football game. Businessmen play the game. The SEC and
we CPAs are the officials—the only difference being that the SEC has a
whistle, but the CPAs don't.
The public, watching from the stands, relies on the officials to see that
everyone plays by the rules—the same rules. The rules are written to
permit a little deceptive ball-handling, designed to fool competitors on
the other team, but not to prevent the spectators from determining how
the game is going—who is gaining ground and who is losing.
Many of the onlookers don't even know what the game is all about. They
just came along to watch because that's what everyone else was doing.
Everyone watching the game is entitled to know that the gains and
losses of all the players are measured against the same yard markers.
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They are entitled to expect that first-down measurements are all made
with the same ten-yard chain, and that all players are battling over 36inch yards. Even the best binoculars don't provide an observer in the
stands with vision equal to that of a person on the playing field. That's
why officials are needed.
Its the very nature of things that occasional disagreements arise between
the players and the officials. Rule enforcers seldom win popularity contests. And, of course, a few shouts from the stands of "Kill the Ump"
are in the best American tradition. In our case, whenever anyone sees
an infraction which escapes the official's view, the shouts come out,
"Where was the Auditor?"
Like officials at other games, the officials in this game of business are
rarely accused of dishonesty, I am happy to say. One hears an occasional
derogatory comment about our eyesight or intelligence, but then the right
to call an Ump blind or stupid is also part of our American Heritage.
Once in a while a particularly incensed spectator may even question the
legitimacy of our birth. Unpleasant as it is to hear epithets such as these,
all of us—officials and players alike—must grin and bear it. For if the
public didn't buy tickets to the game—i.e., if they didn't buy stock in the
companies whose statements we audit—there would be no game.
While many of the spectators may just come along for the ride, the
majority have a vital stake in the outcome of the game. They have
placed heavy bets on one team or another. It's up to the CPA to give
those who have a stake in the game the best possible data with which
to evaluate the teams.
Naturally, I expected applause, or at least rapt attention interrupted periodically by chuckles of amusement at the cleverness of my analogy. Instead, the
judge and jurors exhibited an attitude of obvious skepticism as they shook their
heads in disbelief. When I looked closer, I noted that each of the jurors was also
a bank loan officer. In fact, it began to look like a Robert Morris Associates
meeting.
The examining counsel continued his questioning:
Q. In this football game of business, Mr. Stone, how does it happen that
each team hires its own referees?
A. Traditionally, every firm has always had the right to engage auditors
(and for that matter, all types of professional advisors) of its choice.
The right was questioned during Congressional hearings which preceded passage of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts. When a spokesman for the accounting profession was asked at that time who audits
the auditors, he replied, "Our consciences."
Q. You're supposed to be independent of your clients. Isn't that right,
Mr. Stone?
A. Yes, that is correct. Our code of ethics contains strong rules designed
to insure our independence, both in appearance and in fact.
Q. How can you be independent of the client who pays you? Doesn't
his right to discharge you in favor of another auditor impair your
supposed independence, both in appearance and in fact?
A. No, not at all. We are governed not only by our consciences, but also
by a growing body of official pronouncements which provide guidelines to eliminate at least part of the potential areas of disagreement.
The possibility that some agrieved party might sue for damages un122

doubtedly acts as an additional safeguard against the auditor's succumbing to client pressure. As you probably know, no member of
the auditing firm may serve as an officer or director of the company
to be audited, nor may any member own any interest whatsoever,
either directly or indirectly.
My questioner obviously considered my answer somewhat lame and not altogether responsive. He continued by saying:
Your profession seems to have taken great pains to avoid minor infringements of actual or apparent independence. For example, you can't
audit a company if even a few of its shares are owned by the wife of
one of your partners in Seattle or Miami because that might make it
appear that you aren't independent. Yet you consider your independence
unsullied by the fact that your entire relationship with the client depends
completely on his willingness to re-engage you and to pay your fee.
Although these comments weren't framed as a question, I took the opportunity to comment on the growing feeling that the public is really the CPA's
client and to describe the AICPA's 1967 statement urging corporations to appoint
audit committees composed of outside directors to nominate auditors and to receive their reports. This led to the following additional questions:
Q. Is this AICPA statement binding on anyone?
A. No. It's merely an advisory statement.
Q. As a matter of fact, isn't it true that this advisory statement has had
very little effect on publicly held companies?
A. I believe some corporations have adopted the recommendation, but
I don't know how many.
Q. How would this recommendation affect the thousands of companies
that have no "outside" directors?
A. It would have no effect.
Taking a somewhat different tack, the questioner asked:
Q. Mr. Stone, a minute ago you commented that the CPA's real client
is the public. If that is so, why are auditors' reports addressed to the
company, its board of directors, or its stockholders? Why not "to
whom it may concern" or simply no salutation at all?
After pondering the question for a few moments, I was tempted to quote
Tevye, the impoverished dairyman in "Fiddler on the Roof," who when asked
to explain one of his people's traditions says, "You may ask, 'Why do we wear
our little round skullcaps?' Well, I'll tell you—I don't know."
However, since I had been billed as an expert, I felt obliged to burble a few
ill-chosen words to the effect that the apparent inconsistency was merely evidence of the dynamic nature of the accountant's world. I agreed that different
wording might well be more consistent with the auditor's present relationship
to the public.
At this point, my lawyer took advantage of the rather liberal procedural
rules which pervade my dreams and warned me in a stage whisper that eliminating the traditional salutation from the auditor's opinion could well lead to a
further deterioration of the Ultramares doctrine which requires a greater degree
of care by CPAs to their clients than to third parties who have no privity. Easing
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the seeming distinction between clients and third parties could serve to accelerate that trend.
Then, in a typical display of what for want of a better term I will call "lawyer other-handedness," he said: "But on the other hand, the Shatterproof Glass
decision may have already buried Ultramares." Once again, I yearned for a
one-armed lawyer.
Having been thus forewarned (if not forearmed) by my lawyer, I turned
my attention back to the examining counsel. He concluded his interrogation
with one more salvo:
Q. Mr. Stone, if, as you say, the public is your client, should not your
pay come from the public? After all, he who pays the piper calls
the tune.
Before I could respond, I was dismissed and James Needham, a member
of the Securities Exchange Commission, was called to the witness stand.
Q. Mr. Needham, would you describe your professional qualifications.
A. I am a Certified Public Accountant, and was engaged in the practice
of public accounting for a number of years before appointment to
the SEC.
Q. Is the SEC considering the issuance of a recommendation that outside directors nominate the corporate auditors?
A. Yes, the Commission is considering such a proposal. In its present
form, the recommendation would not have the force of law. If
adopted, it would amount to a strong nudge.
Q. Could you tell us why the SEC is considering this move?
A. We've become concerned about the quality of work performed by
many accounting firms. In fact, I've suggested that accounting firms
might find it beneficial to reevaluate their current large outlays on
professional development in light of the actual audit performance.
The SEC has found instances of problems relating to elementary
disclosure, succumbing to obvious pressure by clients, faulty judgments and decisions at the partnership level of the certifying accounting firms, and questions of independence bordering on commercial
fraud.
After James Needham stepped down, the examining counsel summed up
by saying:
When life insurance companies want to know whether they should bet
on my survival, they don't ask me to hire a doctor—they send me to
theirs. The same thing happens when I apply for a job and the employer
requires a physical examination. Perhaps its time for someone other
than the contestants to hire the referees in the game of business
described by Mr. Stone.
As my dream faded out, I kept hearing the song from the "King and I" in
which the King of Siam, musing on what to tell his son and heir about women,
and life in general, wonders aloud if he should educate him in all the ancient lies.
Then, frustrated at the indecision fostered by his new-found modern knowledge,
the King sings: "When my father was a king, he was a king who knew exactly
what he knew."
As the King says: "Is a puzzlement!"
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Dream No. 2—Audited Forecasts
The second dream I would like to tell you about again found me on the
witness stand. This time, however, the examining counsel was a well-known
financial analyst. His questions went something like this:
Q. I use financial statements to help predict the future. If you insist
on using historical costs, why don't you at least give me a projection
for the next year or two?
A. Management is hesitant to divulge its plans, since to do so might aid
competitors.
Q. Management must have prepared a budget and cash forecast. Why
can't we see them?
A. Management would rather not answer for differences between predicted and actual results. Not only that, unscrupulous managements
could adjust predictions to further their own aims. Over-optimistic
predictions could be used to generate short-range increases in stock
prices. Overly pessimistic predictions could be made public in order
to cause actual results to look good by comparison. From the data in
an annual report, readers can construct their own forecasts.
Q. What you are giving us then, is a kind of "do-it-yourself kit." That
arrangement doesn't seem very efficient. Management and its accountants have the best grasp of the pertinent facts and are most
knowledgeable about future plans. Yet they withhold the very data
we users need. What kind of full disclosure is that?
Even in my somnolent condition, I recognized this as a rhetorical question to
which no answer was expected. Counsel continued:
Q. Do CPAs audit budgets and other forecasts?
A. CPAs often assist clients in preparing budgets and forecasts; however,
we don't audit them. Our ethical rules prohibit the expression of
an opinion on forecasts.
Q. Why the prohibition?
A. CPAs traditionally report on data that is susceptible to objective tests.
Forecasts are based on opinions as to future events. An evaluation of
the likelihood of such events occurring and of their probable results
necessarily must rely largely on subjective evidence.
Q. You say CPAs aren't permitted to render opinions on future events.
Isn't a historical statement full of assumptions about the future? Isn't
your examination of receivables and the related provision for uncollectible accounts explicitly directed toward future collectibility?
Isn't your examination of inventories concerned primarily with future
saleability? Isn't it true, Mr. Stone, that future recoverability of
unamortized plant and equipment costs is one of your principal concerns when examining fixed assets? Similarly, isn't future recoverability of primary concern when you examine capitalized research
and development costs?
You say that CPAs render opinions only on objectively determined
historical costs. Frankly, it seems to me that the line between the
past and the future is hazy indeed. In fact, Mr. Stone, isn't it true
that the "going concern" concept which underlies thefinancialstatements of every business entity is, in effect, an implied opinion as
to the future?
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Suppressing a mischievous desire to ask that the question be repeated, I again
assumed the question to be rhetorical. Mistaking my silence as a sign of tacit
agreement (or at least the absence of any objection) my interrogator continued:
Q. We only consult history to shed some light on the future. Since
auditing purports to be a utilitarian art not an academic exercise,
why do CPAs audit history but not budgets?
My recollection of how this dream ended is somewhat hazy. I recall examining counsel repeating the last question over and over with ever-increasing
insistence. I remember wondering why my lawyer failed to come to my aid by
objecting to the questioner's haranguing and argumentative line of inquiry, until
I noticed that the presiding judge was one Lewis Gilbert.
Should any of you wonder how this dream sequence ends, a midnight snack
consisting of a liverwurst and smoked oyster sandwich on rye and a bottle of
beer will produce an instant replay—at least, that's what induced the original.
Dream No. 3—Management Advisory Services and Independence
I seem to have tuned in late on the next Dream, so I didn't catch the questioner's name. As the dream opened, I was again on the witness stand and
questioning was already underway. This time, the questioner was speaking in
a pleasant, disarming way, with a hint of New York in his voice. He was humming a tune that I couldn't quite place. His questions began:
Q. Mr. Stone, you were saying that audits often result in recommendations to the client.
A. Yes. Most CPAs consider the suggestions for improvement of a
client's operations the most important result of an audit—certainly
the most tangible.
Q. Are CPAs often engaged to render management advisory services
as a result of the recommendations contained in the so-called management letter?
A. That depends somewhat on the nature of the CPA's expertise and
his ability to convince the client that consulting services are needed
and that the CPA is the most logical supplier of those services. In
many instances, CPAs are engaged to render the services recommended in a management letter.
Examining counsel continued in a friendly vein:
Q. Could you give us some examples of these services?
A. CPAs are often engaged to improve a client's accounting system or
even to install a completely new system. We advise clients how
taxes may be reduced by choosing the most beneficial accounting
methods for such items as depreciation and inventory valuation. We
occasionally assist clients in revising their financial structure to improve working capital or to facilitate expansion. Clients sometimes
need help in deciding to buy or lease needed equipment or real
estate. CPAs can be useful in that area as well.
Q. Aren't you being too modest, Mr. Stone? I've read that CPAs contribute to client profitability. I've heard them described as a vital
part of the management team. Don't CPAs often play an important
role in merger, sale and acquisition negotiations?
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I cast my eyes downward, blushing slightly, and kicked my foot to the side
diffidently as I uttered some modest phrase like, "Aw shucks." Then I proceeded
to describe in some detail a few of the more imaginative consulting services I
have performed during my professional career. I must confess that even the
retelling itself became somewhat imaginative as I warmed to the task. I was
feeling positively eloquent by the time I finished.
The euphoria into which I lapsed was interrupted by my questioner. With a
sardonic smile on his lips and a somewhat more insistent tone in his voice he
asked:
Q. After performing these many and varied services for your clients,
Mr. Stone, are you still independent to report to the public? Can you
look objectively at the outcome of a transaction you helped structure?
Can you judge the fairness of data accumulated by a system you
designed?
Jolted out of my blissful state, I started to collect my thoughts in order to
frame a response. The judge, Malcolm Devore, gave me a short respite as he
leaned down from the bench to remonstrate my questioner: "One question at
a time, Professor Briloff, one question at a time." As I heard my questioner's
name, I suddenly remembered the name of the tune he was humming. It came
from "The Mikado" by Gilbert and Sullivan and is called, "I Am the Lord
High Executioner."
Having regained my composure, I delivered the profession's traditional
response:
A. In consulting engagements, CPAs merely advise; decisions are made
by the client.
Judge Malcolm Devore listened with obvious sympathy to my reply, but
Professor Briloff was so busy conferring with his co-counsel, Professor Schulte,
that he didn't seem to be paying much attention to my answer. The moment I
finished, Professor Briloff was back on his feet asking:
Q. Shouldn't a CPA insure his independence, both in fact and in appearance, by refusing to perform consulting services for audit clients?
I responded with the "party line":
A. Any such policy would deprive the client of advice from the person
best qualified to give it. Forcing the client to engage a multitude of
advisors spreads responsibility and diminishes efficiency.
In rebuttal, Professor Briloff commented, "Mr. Stone, your response sounds
like an indictment of a separation-of-duties doctrine which is the very cornerstone of every system of internal control."
I was delighted that the judge relieved me of the obligation to reply by ruling
Briloff's comments out of order. As the dream ended, the jury foreman (who also
turned out to be Malcolm Devore) was applauding Judge Devore's decision.
Dream No. 4—General Acceptance vs. Fairness
I will recount just one more dream before getting to the subject of my talk.
This dream opened in a courtroom where the bailiff was intoning the familiar,
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"Hear ye, hear ye, this court is now in session in the case of General Acceptance
vs. Fairness, Judge Henry J. Friendly presiding." Again, I found myself on the
witness stand. After the usual preliminaries establishing my professional qualifications, the examining counsel, Wilma Soss, proceeded as follows:
Q. Mr. Stone, the standard opinion rendered by CPAs contains the
phrase, "generally accepted accounting principles." Could you tell
the court by whom these accounting principles have been generally
accepted?
A. By preparers, users and auditors of financial statements.
Q. How do CPAs learn of this "general acceptance"? Does some organization take a periodic poll?
A. The Accounting Principles Board, an arm of the American Institute
of CPAs, surveys accounting practices on a continuous basis. As a
result of this surveillance and an extensive program of research, the
APB issues opinions from time to time. Among other things, these
opinions delineate which accounting principles are acceptable and
which are not.
Q. Has the APB issued opinions on all or substantially all of the principles which underliefinancialstatements?
A. No, the body of principles is large and continues to grow as conditions change. Consequently, the APB, its predecessor, The Committee on Accounting Procedure, and the Financial Accounting Standards Board which will soon replace it could never hope to finish
the task. The APB and its predecessor have tried to devote their
resources to those areas most in need of attention.
Q. I understand that alternative means have evolved to portray various
segments of accounting data. When that occurs, Mr. Stone, which
alternative gets the APB's blessing—the method with the most
followers?
A. Not necessarily. While the APB has attempted to narrow and reduce
differences, you should understand that several alternative accounting methods may be considered generally accepted in a given situation, even though they may arrive at different results.
Q. When several acceptable accounting methods are available, which
method does the accountant use in a given situation?
A. Hopefully, the one which results in the fairest presentation of the
facts.
Q. Aha! You said "fairest presentation." That's the first time that you
have said anything about fairness.
A. Fairness is the ultimate aim of all the APB's efforts. General acceptance is merely a means to that end.
Q. Isn't it true, Mr. Stone, that some of the accounting methods in general use fall somewhat short of the fairness standard you describe?
A. I suppose so. However, the APB is trying to weed out the inferior
methods.
Q. A moment ago, Mr. Stone, you said that "hopefully" an accountant
will use the accounting method which results in the fairest presentation. Isn't the auditor required to insist on the fairest alternative
before he expresses an opinion?
A. No, there is no such requirement at present. However, CPAs often
exert their influence in favor of the superior method. Perhaps some
day the use not only of generally accepted accounting principles but
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also of the most desirable GAAP will be required before an auditor
renders an opinion on financial statements.
Q. On the subject of the auditor's opinion, Mr. Stone, the standard language somewhat confuses me. You CPAs say that statements "fairly
present . . . in conformity with GAAP." That phrase could have
several meanings. It could mean:
a. The statements are both fair and in conformity with GAAP.
b. The statements are fair because they are in conformity with GAAP.
c. The statements are fair only to the extent that GAAP are fair.
A. Your confusion is understandable. A special AICPA committee
Which of these meanings does the CPA intend?
urged some years ago that terms such as "present fairly" and "GAAP"
be defined. A survey by Professor Briloff of selected members of
the accounting profession and of the financial community showed
support for each of the interpretations you mentioned and a few
others as well. AICPA literature appears to take the second approach,
i.e., "present fairly" is modified by the "conformity" portion of the
full phrase.
A fair presentation is to be understood within the framework
of GAAP, much as the behavior of football players is to be understood as "fair" within the framework of the rules of football. Just as
what is fair in football may not be considered fair in other forms
of social activity, meeting tests of fairness within the framework of
GAAP does not guarantee meeting such tests from the standpoint
of users of financial statements. This interpretation of the phrase
might be called the "ground rules" theory.*
Q. Does the "ground rules" approach have the widest support among
the members of the accounting profession and the financial community?
A. No, the Briloff survey showed a preference for the first interpretation. This is an understandable reaction from the financial community, but a somewhat surprising reaction from CPAs since it is the
least favorable from the legal liability standpoint. Incidentally, for
some years, Arthur Andersen & Co. worded its opinions: "Present
fairly . . . and were prepared in conformity with generally accepted
accounting principles," which also infers a meaning similar to the
first interpretation.
Q. With so much disagreement among CPAs themselves as to the
meaning of key words in the standard opinion, is it any wonder
that people outside the accounting profession don't know what an
auditor's opinion means?
A. The accounting profession has worked long and hard to improve
communication with the public. The profession unquestionably still
has a long way to go. Since fair presentation of data is clearly the accountant's major goal, it may well be that the term, GAAP, will
prove to be a mere way-station in the evolution of the auditor's
opinion. The term may well disappear in time, taking with it many
questions of semantics which now bedevil writers and readers of
CPA opinions. Should this come to pass, the issues raised in this
dispute between "general acceptance" and "fairness" will become
moot.
* See " 'Present Fairly' and Generally Accepted Accounting Principles," Geraldine F.
Dominiak and Joseph G. Louderback III, The CPA Journal, January, 1972, pp. 45-49.
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I quickly learned how the judge felt about the matter when he instructed
the jury that the critical test in determining if financial statements are false or
misleading is whether they fairly present financial position, not whether they
conform with GAAP. Before a decision was reached, the trial was interrupted
by the clarion call of my alarm clock, arousing me to another day of toil in the
vineyards of public enlightenment.
Unfortunately, problems with auditing don't stop when I awaken. Here
then are a few more of the problems with which auditors must wrestle, awake
or asleep.
Need for a Better Defined Philosophy of Auditing
Some years ago, Mautz and Sharaf published an excellent monograph on
the philosophy of auditing, a subject on which Bob Mautz will further expound
tomorrow. While this work is a good start, I am certain that the authors did not
intend their pioneering efforts as a final word on the subject.
Neither auditors nor their clients seem to have a clearcut understanding of
the auditor's role. In the area of fraud detection, for example, this uncertainty
is evidenced by the fact that many audit procedures seem designed almost entirely
to detect defalcations even though auditors continue to deny any responsibility
for fraud detection. For many years, the public ascribed occult powers to auditors.
Auditors were generally believed to possess near-magical powers to ferret out
misdeeds merely by passing their hands over a set of books. Although auditors
knew full well that no such magical powers existed, they somewhat enjoyed the
effects of these widely held misconceptions and did little to dispel the mystique.
Ony recently, have auditors—prompted by a rash of lawsuits—attempted to
bring their public image into better focus.
The trueblood Committee's findings (re: the objectives of financial statements) could be a prelude to a similar study of audit objectives. Such a study
might well provide a better exposition of just what an audit is, for whom it is
performed, etc.
Need to Recognize Auditing as a Discipline Separate from Accounting
Since CPAs have traditionally audited financial statements, the line between
accounting and auditing is not at all clear. This haziness is further enhanced
by the fact that our reports are traditionally expressed in accounting terms. The
need for a better delineation of auditing as a separate discipline is becoming more
apparent as CPAs are called upon with greater frequency to audit non-financial
data and management performance.
The fuzziness of the line between accounting and auditing has been particularly evident in the protracted attempts to re-word the short form auditor's
opinion. Part of the difficulty may, of course, be attributed to a natural reluctance
to change. However, the main problem lies in the lack of a theoretical underpinning for the entire field of auditing. Without basic theory, it's no surprise
that audit procedures are in a rudimentary stage of development. Drawing inferences from a sample has long been a major technique of auditors. Yet the
use of scientific sampling methods to insure validity and permit establishment
of confidence levels is only recently making headway among auditors. Many
CPAs still view statistical sampling as "organized superstition."
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For auditing to come into its own, it must be severed from accounting and
stand on its own theoretical feet. This move is particularly important if CPAs
expect to be acknowledged as auditors of non-financial data, an important development in my opinion.
By way of example, the decennial census provides data upon which a great
many people rely. The census, then, is an obvious candidate for independent
audit. Were a CPA to undertake such an engagement, he would quickly find
just how intertwined accounting and auditing really are. Few of his questions
concerning theory, procedure, or form of report would be answered by any of
the present auditing literature.
Need for Current Value Reporting
Without reiterating the current value arguments which were presented at
the 1970 Kansas University symposium, historical cost creates problems for
auditors, too. The auditor's function is to add credibility. No amount of auditing
can make incredible statements credible. To most readers, I fear that the implications of historical cost statements are just that—incredible (and unintelligible,
to boot).
My firm audits a company which made a sizable investment in two parcels
of land ten years ago. Last year, the value of one of these parcels dropped substantially below cost. The write-down converted the company's already meager
earnings to a loss, causing a stockholder to dispose of his stock.
The following year, the company sold its other parcel of ground at a gain
which exceeded earnings for the last ten years combined. What do I tell the
selling stockholder when he asks such questions as:
Did the company really make all that money in one year? If not, how
come the last nine years showed so little gain and even a loss last year
when the other parcel was written down to market value?
How credible did my audit make thosefinancialstatements?
Financial Statements Give Erroneous Impression of Precision
The language and dollar amounts which appear in financial statements convey a much greater degree of precision than can be justified. In many respects,
the accountant acts like the head linesman in a football game. After unpiling
fifteen or twenty players, the referee places the ball approximately where he feels
it belongs. Then the head linesman runs in with the chains to see whether the
ball is one inch short or two inches beyond the first down line. So it is with
accountants. After approximating the amount of receivables which will be collected, the resulting estimate is shown as $614,319.23. Nowhere is the reader
put on notice that the accountant is only 95% certain that the receivables total
10% more or less than $614,319.23. If that is the degree of the accountant's certainty, shouldn't thefinancialstatements say so?
By stating earnings per share as an absolute amount of dollars and cents,
that commonly used index is invested with a much greater degree of precision
than any knowledgeable insider intends. Might not this aura of precision be
laid to rest if earnings per share were stated as a range rather than as an
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absolute amount? The use of a range might also lessen the impression of absolute
accuracy which readers now obtain fromfinancialstatements.
Need for Audit Research
Until recently, there has been virtually no research as to the effectiveness of
audit procedures, reflecting auditing's general position as the accounting profession's poor relation. While vast sums have been committed to accounting
research and the work of the APB, only meager resources have been committed
to auditing. Except for statistical sampling, audit procedures have largely been
developed by doing rather than by empirical research.
It's time to subject generally used audit procedures to critical examination.
Just how effective are receivable confirmations, inventory observations, etc.?
The accounting profession might well take a hard look at what went wrong
when companies with robust statements, recently audited, suddenly go bankrupt.
For example, if receivables turn out to be non-existent, perhaps CPAs should
rethink the audit procedures which failed to uncover the problem. Perhaps
research might uncover better audit procedures.
None of these comments should be interpreted as criticism of the recent
revival of the Committee on Auditing Procedure. That committee's present
schedule could hardly be called "too little" even though it certainly came
much "too late."
Accountants' Financial Responsibility
There seems to be a growing interest in the CPA's financial resources. During a recent meeting, a banker put it quite succinctly. He asked: "You say that
CPAs are unlimitedly liable for their work. What assurance does that give a
financial statement user? Are CPAs bonded? Is there any place we can determine the extent of a CPA's assets or insurance?"
It is inevitable that the SEC will soon be asking similar questions. A suggestion, heard infrequently in the past, that CPAs publish their ownfinancialstatements, was recently repeated by John Burton, newly appointed Chief Accountant
of the SEC. The size of an audit fee vis-a-vis the CPA's total income or resources
could well bear on the question of the CPA's independence.
Shortly after World War 1, so the story goes, the King of England sought
advice concerning his country's perilous financial condition. A consultant supposedly advised him to put India in his wife's name. The uncertainties of public
accounting and the soaring cost of liability insurance have prompted many
CPAs to take a similar route. Acceleration of this trend could serve to accentuate
the public's concern over the CPA'sfinancialresponsibility.
Perhaps the public's new-found concern over the accounting profession is
a sign that we have arrived. At least now we are noticed. The CPA's increased
prominence brings to mind the old story of a man who, having been tarred
and feathered, was being ridden out of town on a rail. When he was asked
how he felt about his predicament, he replied: "If it weren't for the honor, I'd
rather walk."
Reporting Requirements Burdensome to Small Business
Although most reporting requirements are equally valid for both large and
small companies, a few rules are obviously geared to the needs of publicly held
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companies. At present, reporting requirements apply equally to companies of all
sizes. Complying with certain of the reporting requirements (e.g., reporting
earnings per share) can sometimes prove burdensome to a closely held company
—a burden which produces meaningless data. It's time that each accounting
and auditing pronouncement be scrutinized to determine whether or not it
should apply equally to public and non-public companies.
Promulgating Auditing Standards—A Problem of Coordination
Inherent in many APB announcements are a number of practical auditing
and reporting problems. Even though the Committee on Auditing Procedure
and the APB are both arms of the AICPA, there appear to be some coordination
problems. When the APB's functions are taken over by the new Financial Accounting Standards Board, a completely independent entity, the problems of
coordination are likely to increase.
Here are a few examples of the hot potatoes with which the Committee on
Auditing Procedure has dealt in recent months. At least in some cases, the problems have been magnified by the APB's unwillingness to expand its general
pronouncements by including more specifics.
1. APB Opinion 20 prevents a change to a less preferable accounting
method. This first raises the question as to what accounting method
is preferable in a given situation. Furthermore, it places the auditor
in a somewhat awkward posture when one client changes to a preferable method of accounting while another client, in identical circumstances, continues to use a less preferable method. The CPA
must give a clean opinion to both clients so long as consistency is
maintained by each. In effect, the CPA is expressing an opinion that
the second client is reporting in a manner which is "consistently
unpreferable."
2. APB Opinion 18 prescribes the equity method for subsidiaries in
which the parent owns 50% or less where the parent exercises "significant influence." Here the APB has attempted to suggest a reasonable guideline by stating that 20% or more ownership will normally be considered "significant." Auditors may expect considerable
client pressure against the equity method when a 25%-owned subsidiary loses money. On the other hand, contrary pressures may be
expected when an 18%-owned subsidiary shows excellent earnings.
3. Similar problems arise when consolidating financial statements.
Where the subsidiary reports on a different fiscal year than the parent,
which statements of the subsidiary should be consolidated with the
parent? The SEC permits consolidation with subsidiary statements
prepared within 93 days of the parent's closing date. The APB, however, has not been that specific. This leaves the auditor with a serious
problem. Should the parent consolidate with audited financial statements for the subsidiary (which statements could be as much as
eleven months old) or should more current unaudited financial
statements be used?
Comfort Letters
I had intended to report to you on an interview with an investment banker
concerning comfort letters. However, his teeth were chattering so from the "cold
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comfort" he's been receiving from auditors' comfort letters that I couldn't understand him. Consequently, let me close with a few unusual applications of
statistical sampling.
Statistical Sampling
I am told that a major life insurance company, seeking to speed up payment
of death claims, decided to use a computerized statistical model to forecast when
policyholders' claims would come due. In this way, the company hoped to
virtually eliminate the need for filing claims. Those policyholders who received
payments of "death" claims were somewhat startled and began to wonder
whether the insurance company knew something they didn't know. However,
few complaints were received from these policyholders. Major complaints came
from widows who upon filing claims on the death of their spouses received a
computer-produced form letter stating that their husbands were not "statistically
dead."
A large department store, seeking to speed up its monthly billing procedure,
devised a computerized model of its business. Feeding in historical data concerning the buying habits of each customer, the computer could then produce
monthly bills without becoming bogged down by the need for posting each individual charge slip. Customers were merely billed an amount equal to their
historical purchases for a given month. The store was finally forced to abandon
the system, not because it received many complaints, but primarily because
charge business tripled when details of the new system leaked out. Describing
the experiment to his superiors, the innovative controller who had devised the
new system said that he had good news and bad news. The good news: just as
predicted by the system designer, even a tripling of charge business put no
strain on the billing system. With no increase in office personnel whatsoever,
the same bills were mailed monthly to charge customers as before the volume
increase. The bad news: the department store was experiencing difficulty in
paying its suppliers. The controller suggested that even this deficiency could be
resolved if all suppliers would adopt the same billing system.
Despite the difficulties experienced by these two companies, my partners
and I decided to experiment with statistical sampling in our accounting practice.
Other practitioners assured us that statistical sampling prevented over-auditing
and provided, at the same time, an acceptable confidence level. We reasoned
that if statistical sampling can work on a client-by-client basis, why not for our
entire practice? Consequently, we now audit a meticulously selected random
sample of our clientele, before rendering an opinion on all of our clients. Naturally, we bill all clients—to avoid any charge of unethical conduct. Let me now
recall, as best I can, one final dream—really just a catnap—that occurred shortly
after we adopted this new modern approach to auditing.
As this dream opens, my six partners and I are standing before Judge Walter
Mansfield just before sentencing. I never did hear the charge, only the jury's
verdict. Oddly enough, the judge was dressed in the ceremonial robes normally
worn by the Emperor of Japan and was singing an excerpt from the Mikado,
one of my favorite Gilbert and Sullivan operettas. Translated into English, his
song went something like this:
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"My object all sublime,
I shall achieve in time,
To let the punishment fit the crime,
The punishment fit the crime."
With this brief preamble, the judge announced the sentence: the seven of
us were to be arranged in random number order (using the last three digits of
our respective social security numbers) before a firing squad of 21 guns. [I
remember thinking what a shame that my first 21-gun salute was also to be my
last.] Each gun, though equipped with six chambers, would contain but one
bullet. In this way, the judge stated that he was "95% sure that 82% of us
would survive—give or take 10%."
As we were remanded to the sheriff's custody, the judge said that he would
have acquitted us had the case been tried before him without a jury—a statement
which relieved all seven of us greatly.
In closing, I say to our chairman, the arranger of this excellent symposium,
that I am delighted that he asked me to talk about problems, not solutions. And
to all of you . . . pleasant dreams!
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